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INTERSPOUSAL DISABILITY DOCTRINE

In the recent case of Self v. Self' the Supreme Court of California
was called upon to decide whether California should continue to follow the
rule of interspousal immunity for intentional torts first announced in that
state in 1909.2 The court held that a wife could recover if the husband
broke her arm in the course of an unlawful assault. Klein v. Klein3 decided the same day, involved an action by a wife against her husband for a
broken leg she allegedly suffered as a result of his negligence. The
court held the wife could recover. In so doing, the common law rule that
a married woman cannot maintain an action against her husband for
injuries caused by his negligent or intentional act 4 has been completely
abandoned.
The weight of authority holds that neither spouse may sue the other
for -personal tort.5 California now agrees with the growing number of
states which hold that since the enactment of the married women's statutes
such an action is permitted. 6 Recently there has developed an intermediate view which recognizes the right to recover for intentional torts while
7
denying the right for negilgent torts.
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Self v. Self, 26 Cal. Rptr. 97, 376 P.2d 65 (1962).
Peters v. Peters, 156 Cal. 32, 103 Pac. 219 (1909).
Klein v. Klein, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102, 376 P.2d 70 (1962).
Phillips v. Barnet, L.R. I Q.B. Div. (Eng.) 436 (1876).
Ferguson v. Davis, 48 Del. 299, 102 A.2d 707 (1954); Thompson v. Thompson, 218
U.S. 611, 54 L.Ed. 1180 (1910) ; Wallach v. Wallach, 94 Ga. App. 576, 95 S.E.2d 750
(1956); Bodenhagen v. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., (Ill.) 5 Wis. 2d 306, 92 N.W.2d 759
(1958) ; Hary v. Arney, 128 Ind. App. 174, 145 N.E. 2d 575 (1957); Re Dolmage's
Estate, 203 Iowa 231, 212 N.W. 553 (dictum) (1927) ; Sink v. Sink, 172 Kan. 217,
239 P.2d 933 (1952); Gremillion v. Caffey (La.) 43 A.L.R.2d 635, 71 So. 2d 670
(1954) ; Gray v. Gray (Me.) 87 N.H. 82, 174 Atl. 508 (1934); Ennis v. Donovan, 222
Md. 161 A.2d 698 (1960); Bissonnette v. Bissonnette (Mass.), 20 C.S. 403, 137 A.2d
354 (1957) ; Kircher v. Kircher, 288 Mich. 669, 286 N.W. 120 (1939) ; Ensminger
v. Campbell, 242 Miss. 519, 134 So. 728 (1961) ; Hamilton v. Fulkerson, - Mo. -,
285 S.W.2d 642 (1955); Conley v. Conley, 92 Mont. 425, 15 P.2d 922 (1932);
Koenigs v. Travis, 246 Minn. 457, 75 N.W.2d 478 (1956) ; Emerson v. Western Seed
& Irrig. Co., 166 Neb. 180, 216 N.W. 297 (1927); Kennedy v. Kennedy, 352 P.2d 833
(1960); Rodgers v. Galindo, 68 N.M. 315, 360 P.2d 400 (1961) ; Koplik v. C. P.
Trucking Corp., 27 N.J. 1, 141 A.2d 34 (1958); Smith v. Smith, 205 Ore. 286, 287
P.2d 572 (1955); Johnson v. Peoples First National Bank & Trust Co., 394 Pa.
116, 145 A.2d 716; Oken v. Oken, 44 R.I. 291, 117 At. 357 (1922); Prince v.
Prince, 205 Tenn. 451, 326 S.W.2d 908 (1959); Cohen v. Cohen, 66 F. Supp. 312,
22 A.L.R.2d 1255n (1946); Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Bennet, 197 Va. 216, 89 S.S.2d 69
(1955); Levlock v. Spanos, 101 N.H. 22, 131 A.2d 319 (1957) ; Goode v. Martinis,
58 Wash. 229, 361 P.2d 941 (1961); Campbell v. Campbell, 145 W.V. 245, 114 S.E.2d
406 (1960); McKinney v. McKinney, 59 Wyo. 204, 135 P.2d 940 (1943).
Bennett v. Bennett, 224 Ala. 335, 140 So. 378 (1932) ; Jaeger v. Jaeger, 262 Wis. 14,
53 N.W.2d 740 (1952); Leach v. Laech, 227 Ark. 599, 300 S.W.2d 15 (1957); Klein
v. Klein, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102, 376 P.2d 70 (1962) ; Rains v. Rains, 97 Colo. 19, 46 P.2d
740 (1935) ; Silverman v. Silverman, 145 Conn. 663, 145 A.2d 826 (1958) ; Alexander
v. Alexander, 140 F. Supp. 925, 229 F.2d 111 (1956) ; Lorang v. Hays, 69 Idaho 440,
209 P.2d 733 (1949); Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 480, 43 A.L.R.2d 626 (1953);
Jernigan v. Jernigan, 236 N.C. 430, 72 S.E.2d 812 (1952) ; Fitzmaurice v. Fitzmaurice,
62 N.D. 191, 242 N.W. 526 (1932); Morin v. Letourneau, 102 N.H. 309, 156 A.2d 131
(1959) ; Pryor v. Merchants Mut. Cas. Co., 12 Misc. 2d 801, 174 N.Y.S.2d 24 (1958) ;
Damn v. Elyria Lodge No. 465, 158 Ohio St. 107, 107 N.E.2d 337 (1952) ; Fiedler
v. Fiedler, 42 Okla. 124, 140 Pac. 1022 (1914) ; Prosser v. Prosser, 114 S.C. 45, 102 S.E.
787 (1920) ; Scotvold v. Scotvold, 68 S.D. 53, 298 N.W. 266 (1941) ; Taylor v. Patten,
2 Utah 2d 404, 275 P.2d 696 (1954); Wait v. Peirce, 191 Wis. 202, 209 N.W. 475
(1926).
Smith v. Smith, 205 Ore. 286, 287 P.2d 576 (1955); Apitz v. Dames, 205 Ore. 242,
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In 1910 the United States Supreme Court decided the case of Thompson
v. Thompson.8 Mr. Justice Harlan, in dissenting, rejected all arguments
supporting the majority view as specious and construed the married
women's acts 9 to permit an action by one spouse for a personal tort
committed by the other, whether it be intentional or negligent in character.
The dissenting opinion stated:
I will not assume that Congress intended to bring about any
such result. I cannot believe that it intended to permit the
wife to sue the husband separately, in tort, for the recovery,
including damages for the detention of her property, and at the
same time deny her the right to sue him, separately, for a tort
committed against her person. 10
This opinion, in which Mr. Justice Holmes and Mrs. Justice Hughes
joined, stands as a landmark for the growing minority view which is now
followed in nineteen states.'1 Prosser has criticized the majority view and
is in accord with other legal writers who feel that there is no possible
12
justification for the old rule except that of historical survival.
Various arguments have been advanced by the majority to support
the common law view of interspousal disability.
(1).
The nonliability of the husband to the wife for damage for
personal tort is founded upon the common law fiction that husband and
wife are one.' 3 Colorado has replied, "It would seem to follow that when
the fiction is abolished, the nonliability does not survive. Reason is the
soul of the law, and when the reason of any particular law ceases so does
the law itself."' 4 Colorado abrogated the common law rule in 1935, having
statutory and constitutional provisions almost identical with those of
Wyoming.15
(2), The wife has an adequate remedy in divorce, separate maintenance and criminal proceedings for the wrongs committed by her husband.1 This argument is obviously untrue, since neither compensates for
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12.
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15.

16.

287 P.2d 585 (1955) ; Kowaleski v. Kowaleski, 227 Ore. 45, 361 P.2d 64 (1961)
Ennis v. Truhitte, 306 S.W.2d 549 (1957).
Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 31 Sup. Ct. 111, 54 L. Ed. 1180, 30 L.R.A.
(n.s.) 1153; 21 Ann. Cas. 921 with Justice Holmes and Justice Hughes joining in the
dissent.
Wyo. Stat. §§ 20-22 to 20-28 (1957).
Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 at 623.
Cases cited note 6 supra.
Prosser on Torts, 2d Ed. at 674, 675 (1955).
13 R. C. L. 1394, 1396.
Rains v. Rains, 97 Colo. 19, 46 P.2d 740 (1935).
See also, Naab v. Smith, 55 Wyo.
181, 97 P.2d 677 (1940).
Wyo.: Wyo.Const., art. 1,§ 8; art. 6, § 1,art. 19, § 9. Wyo.Stat., §§ 20-22 to 20-28
(1957). Rule 17, Rules of Civil Procedure. More particularly Wyo. Stat. § 20-24,
Power to sue and be sued. Any woman may, while married, sue and be sued in all
matters having relation to her property, person or reputation, in the same manner
as if she were sole.
Colo.: Colo. Const. art. 11, § 6; art. 7, § 2; art. 18, § 1, C.R.S. §§ 90-2-1 to 90-2-10
(1953).
Rule 17b Rules of Civil Procedure. More particularly C.R.S. § 90-2-2.
Married women may sue and be sued. Any woman, while married, may sue and
be sued, in all matters having relation to her property, person or reputation, in
the same manner as if she were sole.
Austin v. Austin, 136 Miss. 61, 100 So. 591 (1924).

NOTES

the damage done nor covers all the torts that may be committed. 17
Oklahoma the court stated:
We are unable to perceive wherein either public policy or society,
or the sanctity of the home, or the sacred relations of marriage is
better protected by denying her a reasonable compensation for
injuries maliciously and feloniously inflicted upon her by the
husband with a shotgun loaded with buckshot ...than to allow
her to go into the criminal courts and send him to the penitentary
or into a divorce court and publish their entire married life to the
world.' 8

In

(3). Actions between husband and wife are against public policy
9
because they tend to bring about a dissolution of the marriage.1
This
contention has been held particularly weak by one court in which they
stated:
We can perceive of nothing in the nature of tort action which
would make them the more acrimonious and disturbing to domestic tranquility than property actions, criminal proceedings and
divorce suits. In the rare instances where the wife will sue the
husband despite his20 objections there is probably not much tranquility to preserve.
(4). The allowance of such suits would open new avenues for fraud
and collusion.21 Discussing fraud upon insurance corporations by collusion between spouses, the case of Courtney v. Courtney states, "A man pays
for insurance to indemnify any person whom he injuries by his careless
driving and if it is intended to except his wife from such indemnification
such intent can very easily be expressed in the contract." 22 Negligence
actions by wives against husbands without any notable exception have
involved automobile accidents and have arisen since it has become a common practice for owners of such vehicles to carry insurance that serves
the double purpose of protecting them and compenasting those whom
they or their agents may injure. It is natural and commendable that an
owner who is the head of a family should want this protection to extend
to the members of his family. 2 3 With respect to the question of fraud
it has been very logically submitted that no case should be saddled with
the presumption of fraud ab initio.2

4

There is opportunity for fraud and

collusion in many legal proceedings but our system of courts and juries
is very well designed to seek them out and its presence clearly furnishes
no just or moral basis for precluding honest and meritorious actions.*-5
17.
18.
19.
20.
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23.
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25.

Prosser on Torts, Ed Ed. at 674 (1955).
Example: Ordinary negligent injury is
nowhere a crime, or a ground for divorce.
Fiedeer v. Fiedeer, 42 Okla. 124, 140 Pac. 1022, 1025 (1914).
Johnson v. Peoples First National Bank and Trust Co., 394 Pa. 116, 145 A.2d 719
(1958).
Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 87 P.2d 660 (1939).
Thompson v. Thompson, supra note 8.
See Justice Kimball dissenting in McKinney v. McKinney, 59 Wyo. 204, at 253,
135 P.2d 940 (1943).
Garcia v. Fantauzzi, 20 F.2d 524, 529, C.C.A. 1st (1927).
See Justice Jacobs dissenting in Koplik v. C. P. Trucking Corp., 27 N.J. 1, 141 A.2d
34 at 40.
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(5). If the statutory construction is considered narrow and its consequences socially undesirable the remedy lies in the hands of the legislature.2 6 In this regard Mr. Justice Harlan 27 felt the married women's
acts enacted by Congress for the District of Columbia were so explicit
that no room remained for mere construction. He further stated that,
"If the words used by Congress lead to such a result, and if, as suggested,
that result be undesirable on grounds of public policy, it is not within
the function of the court to ward off the dangers feared or the evils
threatened simply by judicial construction that will defeat the plainly
expressed will of the legislative department. With mere policy, expediency
or justice of legislation the courts, in our system of government, have no
rightful concern. Their duty is only to declare what the law is, not what
in their judgment, it ought to be."
Wyoming considered this question in 1943 in the case of McKinney v.
McKinney2 in which the majority of the three-judge Supreme Court
denied the right of a wife to sue her husband for damages for personal
injuries sustained by reason of his gross negligence in the operation of an
automobile in which she was riding. Justice Riner, speaking for the
majority approved the rule that the married women's statutes 29 had not
abrogated the common law rule of spousal disability ,but instead conferred
upon a married woman only the right to sue and be sued by third persons
as if she were unmarried and without joining her husband. Mr. Justice
Blume, concurring, approved the common law rule but added that an
exception to the rule should be drawn where it is apparent that the husband
was protected by liability insurance. Chief Justice Kimball dissented on
the ground that the language of the Wyoming statutes3 0 was to be construed as entirely overcoming and evincing a legislative intent to abrogate
the common law rule disabling a wife from suing her husband for tort.
Justice Riner, in the majority opinion recalled that it is well settled
that in construing statutes the rules of the common law are not to be
changed by doubtful implication nor overturned except by clear and unambiguous language, citing 25 R.C.L. 1054, Section 280. This section
further provides: "In order to hold that a statute has abrogated common
law rights existing at the date of its enactment it must clearly appear that
they are so repugnant to the act, or the part thereof invoked, that their
survival would in effect deprive it of its effacy and render its provisians
nugatory.31

In 1956 the United States District Court for South Carolina rendered
a very significant decision.3 2 The case involved an action for malicious
26.

Koenigs v. Travis, 246 Minn. 457, 75 N.W.2d 478 (1956).

27.

Thompson v. Thompson, supra note 8.

28.
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32.

McKinney v. McKinney, 59 Wyo. 204, 135 P.2d 940 (1943).

See statutes cited note 15 supra.
Ibid.
McKinney v. McKinney, 59 Wyo. 204 at 213, 135 P.2d 940 (1943).
Alexander v. Alexander, 140 F. Supp. 925, 229 F.2d 111 (1956).

NOTES

prosecution and the laws of Florida controlled the substantive rights of
the parties. The court held: First, that as used in the Constitutional
provision that no state shall deprive any "person" of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law, or deny to any person the equal protection of
the law, .

.

. is broad enough to include any human being who is a citizen

of the United States. Second, the Constitution and laws of the United States
recognize that a married woman is a person and an individual entitled to
the same protection of the laws as other individuals regardless of ancient
provisions of the common law. Third, the Constitution of Florida is the
basic law of the state and supersedes any provision of the common law
which conflicts with it, notwithstanding a state statute adopting the common laws of England which were of general and not local in nature.
Thus the common law of Florida which prohibited suits between
husband and wife for tort has been abrogated by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution and by the Constitution of Florida.
Unquestionably the general purpose of the modern statutes is to
emancipate women and eliminate disabilities which existed under common
law, including the fiction that the husband and wife are legally one. This
writer feels that to continue the common law rule of interspousal disability
defeats the plainly expressed will of the legislative department and in
effect deprives the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of
the State of Wyoming, and the married women's statutes of their effacy
and renders such provisions nugatory. As Justice Crowhart said:
Every step taken to emancipate women from the rigorous restraints
of the common law has been met with dark forebodings on the
part of the judiciary. But now that women have been put on a
parity with men as to their personal and property rights, society
survives, 33with none of the dark portents of the judicial prophets
realized.
The reasoning advanced for denying the husband or wife this right,
is not compelling in light of the modern and more enlightened conception
of marriage. Twenty years have elapsed since the decision of McKinney
v. McKinney with no less than eight additional states abandoning the old
common law rule in favor of the better reasoned minority view. 34 This
trend indicates that Wyoming will undoubtedly re-examine its position
on this question.
WALTER R.

33.
34.

WELLMAN

See Justice Crowhart dissenting in Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 266, 212 N.W. 787 (1927).
Cases cited note 6 supra.

